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Abstract “Audit Quality” is not easy to define because of many diverse factors affecting quality. According to 
the consultation paper of the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), audit 
quality is the significant issue that requires more considerable attention. Understanding how audit 
quality is important requires investigating audit quality factors more precisely. So, the present article 
aims to review and summarize the different audit quality factors, comparing the results achieved by 
the related recent studies. In this regard, as well as the well known audit quality factors such as size, 
industry expertise, auditor tenure, audit fees, non-audit services and auditor reputation, auditor 
specifications, were found to be able to affect audit quality significantly. Moreover, such factors can 
affect each other while affecting the audit quality directly.  
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1. Introduction 
Audit quality may be affected by several factors which can be simply divided into the auditor 
specifications and auditing process attributes. Hence, such factors can directly affect the “audit opinion” 
which is issued to state the reasonable assurance on financial statement reliability thereby enhancing the 
confidence of the market. Despite the unclear definition, importance of the audit quality and its influence on 
market confidence has been highlighted by regulators, investors and corporate governance. As stated in 
“agency theory”, auditor’s opinion certifies the assurance for third parties, who are using the financial 
statement (Lindberg, 2001). Audit quality has been defined as auditor’s ability on discovering the material 
misstatement and reports them (DeAngelo, 1981). So, it has implicit the necessary competence and 
professional behavior along the auditing process, as well as auditor’s independence and objectivity to assure 
that the outcome (audit report) reflects the adequate opinion. 
Despite the wide range of the adopted measures, “size” can be considered as the most effective 
indicator of audit quality determination (Lennox, 1999). Consequently, higher audit quality can be easier 
achieved by the larger audit firm (Francis, 2004), because of their ability to discover and detect the 
misstatements (DeAngelo, 1981). But, reaching high audit quality in small size audit firms is also attainable, 
since because they conform to audit standards (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004; Larn & Chang, 1994). However, 
because of the existence of the auditor-related specifications such as professional competence, technical 
ability, auditor’s liability as well as auditor independence, it is more expected to reach higher audit quality in 
large audit firms (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013). More technical abilities and industry knowledge can be raised 
from the audit expertise. So, demanding for audit expertise leads to higher audit quality (Craswell, Francis, & 
Talylor, 1995), and thereby, enhances auditor’s reputation. In addition, audit tenure may affect audit quality 
positively or negatively. Negative effects may result from a close connection between the auditor and the 
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client which can lead to fraud by ignoring  the material misstatements included in financial statements (Firth, 
Rui, & Wu, 2012), while the positive effects can be achieved through the utilization of the clients financial 
statement knowledge (Dye, 1991). On the other hand, both audit fee and non-audit services may affect audit 
quality, since higher audit quality requires additional procedures resulting in higher audit fees (DeFond, 
Raghunandan & Subramanyam, 2002).  
It must be stated that audit quality is becoming more attractive among other related auditing subjects, 
due to its considerable impacts on the reliability of the financial statements. Moreover, enhancing the 
confidence of the financial statement users can be considered as the result of higher audit quality. Hence, 
through a brief review, we aimed to provide the reader with the principal concepts and recent findings 
regarding the audit quality criteria. For this, the next part of the paper has aimed to provide some definitions 
followed by the main theories of the audit quality. Then, the significance of the audit quality factors has been 
the subject for further discussion to magnify its effects on the audit quality by the last section of the present 
manuscript. It is hoped that the results arising from this study can be beneficial for the audit committee 
members, regulators, shareholders and academic users who are interested in the investigation of the 
significant role of the mentioned factors during the auditing process as well as preparation of the related 
statements. 
 
2. Terms and definitions 
Auditors intend to issue an opinion that providing a reasonable assurance on the fairness and credibility 
of financial statement, detecting the material misstatements. So, audit quality has been defined as the 
likelihood to discover and report material misstatements by auditor’s technical capabilities, as stated by 
DeAngelo (1981). In these circumstances auditor’s independence is also crucial when reporting the discovered 
errors. Discover and report material errors, dependents on different factors related to auditors competencies. 
Training and experience qualifies the auditor to discover material misstatements. Moreover, independence 
would be the condition to report what has been discovered (Colbert & Murray, 1995). 
In addition to the auditor’s independence, other individual specifications such as professional 
competence, specialized knowledge, liability and expertise of the auditor are important factors influencing the 
quality of auditor professional judgment, and hence, audit quality. As the audit process increases the 
informational value of the accounts, auditor’s report can affect the use of accounts. In order to guarantee the 
auditor’s independent opinion, it is needed for auditors to enhance their professional judgment independency 
(Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002). In other words, in order to maintain the auditor’s independency, 
auditor’s are obliged to improve their professional judgment, and thereby, to increase the ability of providing 
information value for users (Arrunada, 2000; Thornton, 2003). 
Both actual quality and perceived quality have been argued as important issues in audit quality 
definition. Actual audit quality can be considered as the probability of reducing the risk of reporting a material 
misstatement in the financial statement (Palmrose, 1988). While perceived quality is the belief of financial 
statement users about auditor’s ability to reduce the material misstatements. In this situation, greater 
perceived audit quality can result in investment process improvement in audited clients. It can be stated that 
audit quality represents how can the auditing process detect and report material misstatements of the 
financial statements in terms of reaching reasonable assurance (DeAngelo, 1981). The belief of users about 
audit quality results from auditor’s named individual specifications as important factors. Such high audit 
quality should be associated with high information quality of the financial statements (Balsam, Krishnan, & 
Yang, 2003). The main reason for this is that financial statements audited by high quality auditors should be 
less likely to contain material misstatements. In this case, audit quality is achieved not only by discovering 
misstatements but also through the client who make the adequate adjustments.  
  Considering client’s perspective, reaching higher quality in auditing process and report can be stated 
as one important purpose. Due to the wealth function of the firm, shareholders are more interested in getting 
high quality audit reports, whereby preferred higher quality audit. Stakeholders are also concerned about 
audit quality. Accordingly, the lack of the audit quality may decrease the probability of discovering an audit 
failure (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004). In addition, the factors that have been studied in the present 
manuscript influence audit quality directly or indirectly. Such factors make audit quality more important to be 
studied.  
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3. Influencing factors 
The importance of factors which influence audit quality has been argued in many studies. As stated 
before, such factors can affect audit quality directly or indirectly which are individually consistent with some 
audit quality proxies. Meanwhile, this manuscript aims to present a clearer attitude on the classification of the 
audit quality factors that may influence audit quality. 
 
3.1. Size 
The link between the request for audit services and audits to large-firms is based on the “agency 
theory” as well as the links between audit quality and the auditor size (Lindberg, 2001). Therefore, clients 
intend to choose a high quality auditor to reach the best auditing results. So, they are more interested in 
demanding for large audit firms with higher reputation compared with small audit firms. The higher 
reputation, the higher incentive to issue clean and accurate audit report, because inaccurate audit reports can 
lead to decline the reputation. The decline of reputation could result in attracting fewer clients and in the 
decrease of audit fees. Large auditors with higher credible clients can suffer noticeable losses compared with 
small auditors if they issue inaccurate reports. Therefore, the large audit firms have more incentive to issue a 
reliable audit report with the purpose of maintaining their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Some factors such as professional competence, auditor’s qualification and supporting technical 
information undoubtedly can be found in large audit firm’s system. Such factors can be taken into 
consideration when assessing the influence of audit firm’s size on audit quality to facilitate the detection of 
the possible errors (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013). Because of the higher degree of specialization of large audit 
firm’s employees, the technological knowledge of audit groups in large firms would be higher than in small 
auditors. In other words, continuing professional education is more considerable in large audit firms than in 
small ones (O’Keefe & Westort, 1992). Larger audit firms support higher quality audits (Francis, 2004). Also, 
the utilization of high quality auditors reveals that large entities (client) prefer to choose a high level of audit 
quality with higher technical knowledge. So, when the firm becomes larger, a higher audit quality will be 
demanded with the purpose of enhancing the monitoring and bonding activities. Also, adopting such 
strategies will be beneficial to the client, despite some inevitable operating costs (Hay & Davis, 2004). 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between audit quality and auditor size (e.g., Francis & 
Yu, 2009; Hay & Davis, 2004). Most of them confirmed that the large size auditors are positively correlated 
with audit quality (e.g., Colbert & Murray, 1995; DeAngelo, 1981; O’Keefe & Westort, 1992). On the other 
hand, some other surveys have mentioned that there is no difference between large audit firms and smalls 
one in terms of their impact on audit quality, both of them have the potential to reach an acceptable level 
audit quality (e.g., Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004; Jackson, Moldrich, & Roebuck, 2008; Larn & Chang, 1994). 
However, it seems that larger audit firms are more qualified and committed to reach a higher audit quality. It 
can be attributed to their high technical information and professional competencies as well as their attempt 
to continue higher education of employees and to maintain firm’s reputation on issuing an appropriate audit 
report. Such activities are necessary in order to keep their clients. In Fig.1 the relationship between audit 
quality factors and audit size is illustrated.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The observed relationships between audit quality factors and size 
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Figure 1. The observed relationships between audit quality factors and size. 1,2: Not relationship has 
been observed between size and both audit tenure and non-audit fee. 3: (a) The larger audit firm size may 
reach the higher reputation in order to issuing more reliable and accurate audit report. (b) The larger audit 
firm with the higher reputation may demand for more audit fee (6). 4: (a) The large audit firm may earn more 
audit fee due to operate with higher quality of monitoring and bonding. (b) The large audit firm may demand 
higher audit fee in order to higher level of audit expertise (7).  (c) In terms of brand name, the larger audit 
firm may capture more audit fee. 5: The larger audit firm may operate with higher level of auditor 
specialization. 
 
3.2. Industry expertise 
According to literature, it is clear that the expertise of the auditor plays an important role in improving 
audit quality. Demanding auditor specialization in an industry leads to a higher level of technical competence 
and technical information. It is mainly due to auditor’s potential ability to detect financial statement errors 
(Arrunada, 2000). In this case, industry expertise knowledge enhances the likelihood that auditors discover 
errors, and thereby, affect the probability of reporting the discovered errors (Hammersley, 2006). Requesting 
industry expertise can represent an incentive for audit firm to invest in expertise and to desire industry-based 
costumers. Besides, the industries which normally use the expertise contract, accounting related 
technologies, are more powerful to reach a higher level of audit quality by utilizing industry expert auditors 
than non-expert auditors (Craswell et al., 1995). So, audit quality is positively related to specialization and 
industry expertise (Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder, & Davies, 2007). In addition, audit tenure is directly related to 
the industry expertise, because of a new industrial audit client can desire to benefit from audit expertise, 
technical ability and knowledge. So, auditors will be able to fulfill the lack of client-specific knowledge during 
the first years of audit tenure (Stanley & Todd DeZoort, 2007). In this regard, higher audit fee increases as 
audit expertise enhances. This is mainly due to the fact that higher audit expertise can lead to higher audit 
quality (Francis, 2004). In other words, additional investment on expertise can cause a positive effect on the 
audit fee premium (Craswell et al., 1995). Hence, industry expertise is positively associated with audit fee and 
audit quality (Cahan, Godfrey, Hamilton, & Jeter, 2008). In this situation, industry expertise might reach more 
premiums compared to non-industry expertise (Wang & Iqbal, 2009). In addition, industry expertise, 
reinforced by auditors during the engagements, will lead to higher audit quality (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013). 
Such experiences can also enhance the audit reputation through market credibility. In summary, industry 
expertise advantages together with general audit knowledge can enhance the audit technical ability and audit 
reputation and so increase audit quality as well as leading to a higher level of audit fees. 
 
3.3. Auditor tenure 
Audit tenure has been investigated as short and large audit tenures. In this regard, studies have 
mentioned that the shorter the auditor’s tenure, the less auditor client knowledge. As a result, lower audit 
quality is expected. In contrast, longer audit tenure can lead to decrease auditor’s professional care, and 
therefore reducing audit quality. On the other hand, with larger audit tenure it is more likely to discover 
misstatements using technical abilities and higher levels of knowledge. But the relationship between auditor 
and client may reduce independence and can reduce the probability of report misstatements. So, short audit 
tenure may involve the auditors with the risk of less technical knowledge and abilities. Therefore, the audit 
report quality can also be affected by audit tenure. Generally, auditors have more incentive to issue a clean or 
acceptable audit report in the first years of their engagements. In terms of client’s perspective, maintaining 
auditor for next period can depend on the issuing of a clean audit report. Therefore, if auditors know that 
clients are considering switching them, it can influence the type of audit report (Vanstraelen, 2000).  
Then, such reactions can adversely affect auditor’s independence, and thereby, reduce audit quality. In 
fact, in the first years of the connection between auditor and client, audit failures are generally higher and rise 
the audit costs due to the need of additional procedures by the new auditor (Barbara, Richard & Kurt, 2006). 
The auditor’s mandatory rotation may cause some additional actions due to the loss of industry expertise and 
necessary information about financial report in the first years, which may enhance the likelihood of the audit 
failure (Gavious, 2007), as well as the additional costs to support the new auditor with the information about 
International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences 
Vol. 4 (2), pp. 243–254, © 2014 HRMARS 
 
 247 
client’s normal and special functions (Chi, Huang, Liao & Xie, 2009). Such additional costs, negatively affect the 
relationships between the mandatory audit-firm rotation and audit quality (Chi et al., 2009). So, if there is no 
mandatory rotation, auditors are more likely to preserve longer tenures by satisfying clients. The idea that 
long term audit tenure may lead to lower audit quality has been confirmed by previous studies (Adenuyi & 
Mieseigha, 2013; C.-Y. Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008; F. A. Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009; F. A. Gul, Jaggi, & Krishnan, 2007; 
Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002). Also, long term relationships between auditors and clients may cause 
the familiarity between auditors and management. This can lead to reduce auditor’s independence and audit 
quality as well (Carey & Simnett, 2006). Therefore, as stated by legislators and business press, mandatory 
auditor rotation has been recommended, in order to increase the auditor’s independence and to prevent 
fraud on issuing report (Barbara et al., 2006). Such negative relationships between auditor tenure and audit 
quality have been widely investigated, for instance by Carey & Simnett (2006); Choi & Doogar (2005). 
In order to influence audit opinions, managers may switch auditors if they issue a qualified opinion. This 
represents an incentive for the auditor to issue an inadequate report. However, managers may not tend to 
switch auditors after receiving a qualified report. In fact, managers are willing, in several circumstances to 
receive a high quality audit report. In a situation of quasi-rent audit fees, managers will receive more 
satisfying reports from incumbent auditors compared to their switching by a new auditor (Jackson et al., 
2008). In other words, long term relationships between auditors and clients may increase the incentive for the 
auditor to issue an unqualified report (Vanstraelen, 2000). Rotation initially can lead to lower audit quality 
due to the need to compensate the lack of client auditor knowledge (Francis, 2004). However, incumbent 
auditors may not report discovered misstatements. In this case, they are cheating by issuing a clean report 
which results from lower auditor independence and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Furthermore, some relationships can be observed between audit tenure and financial reports quality, 
when restating or modifying the financial statements and then the audit report. Restating financial statement 
after rotation means that the initial financial report was consistent with the misstatement(s) and fraud(s). 
Accordingly, the new audit report (after restatement of financial statements) makes visible the low quality of 
the previous audit. (Stanley & Todd DeZoort, 2007). Thus, mandatory auditor rotation will increase the 
likelihood of financial statement restatement compared to non-rotation firms (Firth et al., 2012). Therefore, 
there is an inverse relationship between the audit long tenure and the restatement financial report (Stanley & 
Todd DeZoort, 2007). 
In conclusion, long term relationships between auditors and client may reduce auditor’s independence, 
and thereby, decrease the audit quality. On the other hand, mandatory auditor rotations can lead to 
additional costs due to the need for additional procedures by new auditors. So, this gives the incentive for 
restating financial reports to capture unqualified audit opinion. In this situation, auditor’s impairment of 
independence and lower audit quality of the initial audits is notorious.  
 
3.4. Audit fee 
Audit fee as an important factor of audit quality has been used in several studies, specifically in 
examining the link between audit quality and the size (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Francis, 2004; Hay & Davis, 
2004). Greater audit fees are also associated with the choice of qualified auditors (Hay & Davis, 2004). In spite 
of higher audit fee, some clients are more interested in using large audit firms. Clients are confident that large 
audit firms have greater monitoring and bonding in order to capture higher audit quality (Hay & Davis, 2004). 
In terms of the auditor competence and specialization, including technical information and continuing 
education, large audit firms hire better professionals in comparison to small size firms. So, the larger the audit 
firm the higher auditor’s specialization (and audit quality) is expected and therefore higher audit fees is 
achieved (DeAngelo, 1981). For instance, as the demand for higher audit quality as well as additional activities 
is increased, higher audit fee is expected for company (Houghton & Jubb, 1999). On the other hand, the 
reputation of audit firms can be negatively influenced by high-risk clients, and so, because of such influences, 
undoubtedly higher audit fee is charged by larger audit firms (Hogan, 1997).  
However, no relationship may be identified in cases of doubts regarding going concern between audit 
fees and “going concern opinion” (DeFond et al., 2002), and the “demanding for audit quality” (Lindberg, 
2001). Maintaining the reputation, auditors wish to perform an acceptable audit work. In summary, higher 
audit fee may result in greater audit quality (Eshleman & Guo, 2014) through increasing audit efforts as well 
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as the utilization of higher qualified auditors. In terms of brand name, larger audit firms may demand higher 
audit fees (Basioudis & Fifi, 2004). In contrary, since large audit firms are willing to preserve their reputation 
they do not have incentive to receive higher fees or fee premium as a condition to conduct high audit quality 
work. 
 
3.5. Non-audit service 
Non-audit services as well as the audit service can affect the audit quality (Jeong, Jung & Lee, 2005). To 
be more precise, auditing cost fluctuations can result from the changes in both audit fee and non-audit 
services (Ding & Jia, 2012). It has been argued by Houghton & Jubb (1999) that non-audit services fee is less 
price-sensitive compared to the audit fee and can play an important role to enhance the audit firm partners’s 
wealth. However, it is expected a positive relationship between qualified audit reports and both audit quality 
and non-audit fee (Houghton & Jubb, 1999). The regulators and AICPA have strongly highlighted the 
independence of the auditor. In addition to the economic theory about the auditor’s independence, SEC rules 
express that contrary to the actual audit, perceived auditor independence is a function of non-audit fee ratio 
(Schmidt, 2012). The temptation to earn more non-audit fee could impair the auditor’s independence 
(Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002). 
In terms of quasi-rent, a higher probability of maintaining quality in both auditing and non-audit 
services substantially results from continuous contracts. In this case, compliance with obligations is not logic. 
However, it is highly related to the internal incentives of the involving parties, especially those which are the 
cause of the reputation acquisition. The implicit contracts mechanism is thus beneficial to the parts 
(Arrunada, 2000). It can be considered as one of the quasi-rent benefits, resulting from costs reduction. This is 
explained by the difference between the wages paid for the current use of productive resource and their 
maximum best alternative applications (Chow, 1982). To enhance the effectiveness of the implicit contracting, 
the auditor must ensure to obtain a stream of quasi-rents, which maintains his incentive to present an 
acceptable performance (Arrunada, 2000). 
In general, investors are not concerned about loss of auditor’s independence who is auditing large 
clients in comparison to auditing small clients (Ghosh, Kallapur & Moon, 2009). This is mainly due to the fact 
that auditors receive incentives to be specifically considered about the loss of reputation which results from 
independence impairment in their audits for large clients. Moreover, the auditors are less economically 
dependent on small clients. Thus, since non-audit services result usually from large clients, high levels of non-
audit services can decrease the auditor independence and may also affect the audit quality (Francis, 2004). 
 
3.6. Auditor reputation 
In common, large audit firms have more reputation than smaller ones. So, the reputation cost in the 
smaller firms is considerably less than in the large audit firms (Hogan, 1997). Hence, larger firms not only have 
incentives to maintain their existing level of reputation, but they also wish to enhance it by presenting 
accurate audit report.  This is mainly due to the potential effect of audit quality on auditor reputation. 
Reputation can serve as a proxy in examining the relationship between audit quality and both audit size and 
audit fees. Based on “capital theory”, due to more credibility of larger auditors, audit firms with great 
reputation are considered to be more accurate (Teoh & Wong, 1993). It means that the large auditors, having 
more reputation, are more likely to issue accurate audit report (Lennox, 1999). This theory also reveals that 
more credible audit firms can demand higher audit fees, because of the market value of their audit reports 
(Lindberg, 2001). However, such higher audit fees, may lead to decrease auditor’s independence (DeFond et 
al., 2002), because higher audit fees can represent clients intention to get a clear audit report. Thereby, 
auditors may lose their independence and so their reputation. So, a negative effect between auditor 
reputation and audit fees can occur (Tomczyk, 1996). As a result, the auditor reputation as well as the audit 
fee can be influenced. Table 1 summarizes the results arising from theoretical and empirical studies about the 
audit quality factors. 
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Table 1. Summary of the audit quality factors based on the results of previous theoretical and empirical 
studies 
 
Factor 
Observed Relationship 
Positive Negative No-effect 
Size 
(Colbert & Murray, 1995; 
DeAngelo, 1981; Francis, 
2004; O’Keefe & Westort, 
1992) 
Not Observed 
(Bauwhede & Willekens, 
2004; Jackson et al., 2008; 
Jeong & Rho, 2004; Larn & 
Chang, 1994) 
Industry 
Expertise 
(Francis, 2004; Lowensohn 
et al., 2007) 
Not Observed Not Observed 
Auditor 
Tenure 
(Chi et al., 2009)z 
(Carey & Simnett, 2006; C.-Y. 
Chen et al., 2008; Choi & 
Doogar, 2005; F. a. Gul et al., 
2009; F. A. Gul et al., 2007; 
Johnson et al., 2002) 
Not Observed 
Audit Fee (Eshleman & Guo, 2014) Not Observed (Lindberg, 2001) 
Non-Audit 
Service 
(Houghton & Jubb, 1999) 
Not Observed 
(Francis, 2004) 
Auditor 
Reputation 
(Teoh & Wong, 1993) 
Not Observed 
Not Observed 
 
4. Auditors specifications  
4.1. Independence  
Auditor’s independence is the capacity of auditor to act, in mind and in appearance, objectively without 
influences. Non-audit service as an audit quality factor can have a considerable impact on auditor’s 
independence, and regulators have been deeply concerned about that. So, independent auditing can be 
considered as a fundamental specification in any active capital markets. In this regard, most of regulators 
have stated that non-audit services can lead auditors to lose their independence in order to capture larger 
non-audit service (Chen, Elder, & Liu, 2005; Gul et al., 2007; Thornton & Shaub, 2014). As stated by Simunic 
(1984), auditor engagements as management consultants can compromise auditor’s independence. However, 
being worried about reputation loss as well as litigation costs can maintain auditors independent (DeFond et 
al., 2002). Concerning non-audit services, SEC 2000 has mentioned two situations about auditor’s 
independence: first, the probability that auditors become financially dependent of clients as a result of non-
audit services. Such dependence can ensure the auditors to keep their engagement. Secondly, the consulting 
nature of many non-audit services may lead auditors to act against the audit process, as a result of the 
managerial roles. As a conclusion, auditor’s independence can be considered as a specification which is 
strongly associated with audit quality factors. Thereby, auditor’s independence may strongly influence audit 
quality.  
 
4.2. Liability 
The impact of liability on audit quality has been investigated by various studies (e.g., Acemoglu & 
Gietzmann, 1997; Dye, 1993; Fargher, Taylor, & Simon, 2001; Free, 1999; Mlumad & Thoman, 1990; 
Narayanan, 1994). In common, audit firms have liability for their actions considering their accountability to 
the regulators (Chung, Farrar, Puri, & Thorne, 2010). For some reasons, the auditors may be pressured by such 
conditions to be serious and accurate in their functions. Risk of litigation and litigation costs resulting from 
perceived audit failures (real or not real) are usually associated with auditor’s liability. In this regard, litigation 
costs may arise from sources such as clients, investors and other financial statement users. Such costs may 
cause liability payments and loss of reputation. Moreover, litigation risk can put auditors under pressure to 
accept a client. In addition, litigation risks can create an incentive for auditors to be more diligent on their 
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duties. So, the auditors are responsible to give satisfying answers to the economic players and stakeholders 
(Free, 1999). Because of the financial statement importance for market, logically higher degree of auditor 
liability is expected by the investors. Thereby, such expectations may lead to take more considerations into 
account, when auditors are at risk of liability payment. Then, considerable liability payment can be insurance 
for investor to prevent possible audit failures (Schwartz, 1997). Therefore, litigation risk can cause high audit 
quality. In this regard, audit costs will be increased due to the necessity of more skills and higher efficiency to 
achieve high levels of audit quality, which may result in significant drop of litigation costs. Thus, litigation costs 
can affect both higher audit quality and higher audit cost, directly or indirectly (Narayanan, 1994).   
Concerning size, more liability is expected from the large audit firms, by clients and investors. Such 
liabilities normally lead large audit firms to reduce litigation risks, which may be resulted from the audit 
failure (Ding & Jia, 2012). In other words, larger audit firms with higher liability potentially have more 
litigation risks and costs that may lead to higher considerations on audit services, and thereby increase audit 
quality (DeFond, 2012; Lennox & Li, 2012). Regarding auditor’s new engagement and client acceptance, some 
reasons may cause auditors to reject high risk clients in order to prevent litigation risks and costs. First of all 
there is the risk that auditors can be litigated from investors after an audit failure. Secondly, legal liability 
payments from auditors to investors, which arise from investor’s complaint, can be considered in this regard. 
Eventually, extra litigation costs such as attorney fees and, more important, loss of reputation can force the 
auditor to reject a high risk client (Laux & Newman, 2010). Such client acceptances may also impair the 
perceived auditor independence, causing the demanding of higher audit fees (Schneider, 2011). Therefore, 
the decision of accepting a high risk client can affect audit quality. This is mainly because of high litigation risks 
and costs, particularly when audit firm is becoming larger. So, it may lead larger audit firms to be more precise 
in selecting and accepting clients, in order to reduce litigation risk (Kaplan & Williams, 2012).  
However, both less and more liability may put audit firm partners at risk. Less liability may lead to 
auditor’s negative mind about their independence credibility. Moreover, higher liability may lead to higher 
audit costs for partners. Therefore, partners shouldn’t be involved in increasing the liability (Acemoglu & 
Gietzmann, 1997). In conclusion, auditor’s liability to investors, clients and market can reduce the litigation 
risks and costs by reducing audit failures, and thereby, increasing audit quality. 
 
4.3. Professional competence  
Professional competence, as stated at the first section of audit general standards, plays an important 
role in the audit process. Particularly, it may contain a considerable impact on the auditor’s professional 
judgment as well as on quality. The concept of the professional competence covers two substantial aspects of 
auditor’s competencies. The first aspect is the professional competence attainment which is required to 
benefit from higher education. Such merits are improved based on the principles of public accountants, 
acquired by education, training, exams and professional experience. Maintenance professional competence 
can be considered as the second aspect that requires:  
a) Continuous improvement of the knowledge and skills regarding career changes and developments, in 
particular, the utilization of the programs which execution must be ensured. Such career changes and 
developments include new ideas and principles on accounting and auditing standards as well as the related 
rules and regulations.  
b) Audit services subject to appropriate control systems in conformity with the principles and 
professional standards. In terms of maintaining professional competence in addition to such auditor’s 
abilities, auditor’s behavior (such as professional ethics, being open-minded, keeping aware perspective, 
acting as self-reliant and being decisive in their professional judgment) should be considered in evaluating 
auditor’s competence. Such aspects need to be taken into consideration in audit plan, in order to attain the 
audit program and objectives, and thereby, achieving high audit quality (IAESB, 2006; ISO 19011:2011).   
Table 2 summarizes the observed relationships between specifications and factors and their impacts on 
audit quality. 
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Table 2. A summary of the observed relationship between specification and factor and its impact on the audit 
quality 
 
Auditors 
Specifications 
Relationships with 
Other Factors 
Observed Effect on the Audit Quality 
 Positive Negative 
Independence (Longe) Audit tenuer Not Observed (Carey & Simnett, 2006) 
 (Higher) Non-audit fee Not Observed 
(DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel 
et al., 2002; Thornton & 
Shaub, 2014) 
 (Higher) Reputation (Tomczyk, 1996) Not Observed 
Liability (Loss of) Reputation Not Observed (DeFond et al., 2002) 
 
(The larger audit firm 
the higher liability) Size 
(DeFond, 2012; Ding & Jia, 
2012; Kaplan & Williams, 
2012; Lennox & Li, 2012) 
Not Observed 
Competence Size (Hussein & Hanefah, 2013) Not Observed 
 Industry Expertise (Arrunada, 2000) Not Observed 
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
Considering the main purpose of this study, a literature review has been conducted. The main purpose 
was to identify the different factors with potential influence on audit quality. The auditor specifications have 
also been taken into account. The size of audit firm can be considered as one of the most important factors 
which can affect the other factors as well as the overall audit quality. Furthermore, the reviewed factors, 
including size, industry expertise, auditor tenure, audit fees, non-audit service, auditor reputation and auditor 
specifications, were found to be correlated with each other when studying the effect of each individual factor 
on audit quality. Also, auditor specifications such as professional competence, technical ability, independence 
and auditor’s liability have been identified to have significant effects on audit quality. Assuming that audit 
quality has reached a social desirable level, some important future research directions should be considered. 
In this regard, the relationships between audit quality factors, corporate governance and decision makers 
must be taken into account. Moreover, considering the importance of audit quality, more specific studies on 
audit quality influencing factors are necessary in order to classify such factors, which can have great 
consequences in both practical and theoretical applications.  
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